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Simple Summary

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Lower the collateralization ratio for snx staking to 400% on optimism.

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Overview

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The SIP aims to evening out the c-ratios for SNX stakers across both ethereum and optimism, given that post debt synthesis the debt pools are unified.

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Motivation

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Currently the c-ratio for SNX stakers on L1 is 400% while the c-ratio for SNX stakers on L2 is 500%. After debt synthesis the debt pools of L1 and L2 effectively should remain equivalent. The c-ratio percentage should be equal for all stakers in fairness; so that minters can mint the same amount of synths independent of the network where SNX is staked.

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Rationale

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To even the playing field for all SNX stakers after debt synthesis independent of the network where they are staking SNX.
\nGiven the high staking proportion on optimism (90%), we should expect the debt issued by snx stakers to increase from 46m sUSD to around 60m sUSD in the situation where all snx stakers on optimism, utilize the 100% excess minting capacity (limited at the 400% min ratio).

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Specification

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C-ratio on L1 = 400%\nC-ratio on L2 = 400%

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Copyright

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Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

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